Timeline of Events Surrounding J6 D.C. National Guard Deployment Shows Politically Motivated Decisions

As Kamala Harris and Democrats continue to use January 6 as a campaign issue, it is important to recall those responsible for preventing the National Guard from protecting the Capitol.

Thanks to the surgeon-like precision of my researcher Haley McLean, this timeline (we believe) represents the most exhaustive one to date showing the requests and denials related to the deployment of the D.C. National Guard before and on January 6, 2021. Events have been curated from a number of resources including congressional testimony, internal agency investigations, media coverage, videos, and book excerpts.

We preface the timeline with critical context and information about the lead-up to January 6 involving key political operatives and known foes of President Trump.

Summer 2020

Jamie Fleet, then-Democratic staffer for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and the Committee on House Administration (chaired, at the time, by Rep. Zoe Lofgren, who was later appointed to Pelosi’s January 6 Select Committee) had a team of counselors working in anticipation of coming debates and objections from states—including Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Georgia—about the certification of the electoral college vote. Knowing that objections would likely be raised on January 6, Fleet’s team began contingency planning to prepare for the possibility that the proceedings would "not [be] traditional."

June 2020

• Following the June 1 photo op at Lafayette Square during the BLM riots in Washington, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley contemplated resigning. Sitting in his Pentagon office, Milley wrote several drafts of a letter of resignation. Milley sought advice from a wide circle of confidants, including Joseph Dunford, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs under the Obama administration; retired Army General James Dubik; members of Congress; former officials with the George W. Bush and Obama administrations; and Robert Gates, former secretary of Defense and CIA chief. Most agreed with Gates’s advice: “Make them fire you. Don’t resign.” 

  • After Lafayette Square, Gates told both Gen. Milley and then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper that, “given Trump’s increasingly erratic and dangerous behavior, they needed to stay in the Pentagon as long as they could.” 

• By June 10, 2020 Gen. Milley had decided not to resign. “Fuck that shit,” he reportedly told his staff. “I’ll just fight him.” Milley assured his confidants that he would never openly defy the president—a move he considered illegal—but he was “determined to plant flags.” He told his staff, “If they want to court-martial me or put me in prison, have at it, but I will fight from the inside.” Milley saw himself as “tasked” with safeguarding “against Trump and his people” from potentially misusing the military, something he confided in a “trusted confidant” to ensure he remained true to this plan. “I have four tasks from now until the twentieth of January,” he affirmed, “and I’m going to accomplish my mission.”

  • Milley “sought to get the message to Democrats that he would not go along with any further efforts by the president to deploy the machinery of war for domestic political ends. He called both Pelosi and Schumer.” 

• Gen. Milley stood up a crisis management team that was “dedicated to monitoring domestic unrest.” He outlined his and his staff's efforts in four phases: “So I said—and this is from June—so I said: Phase one is now through the election, and phase two is the election out through the certification, which was known, it was a known date, the 6th. So from the election to the certification. Phase three, I said, was certification to inauguration. And phase four was inauguration plus 100 days.” 

  • Every morning at Gen. Milley’s direction, he and his staff began tracking civil disturbances in the United States, focusing on events and incidents involving groups such as the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers. Milley explained, “when I say ‘tracking’ I had the Joint Staff report, set up a system of reporting in the morning at our normal 7:30 meeting” and “the reports from every morning and it’s June, July, August, September, October, all the way through.” 

  • Milley and his team “had LNOs [Liaison Officers] with the FBI, in the FBI building … I think we called it domestic unrest as a general thing,” and “we just worked with the FBI and local police, and we made sure that we kept track of it. And we stood up a team to make sure that we, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I, had situational awareness just like we have overseas.” 

  • Milley had his Joint Staff historian “conduct an in-depth research on the use of the Insurrection Act, what it's all about, going all the way back to 1807 or whatever year it started, all the historical examples, laid out every single one of them in detail. The historian would walk me through it.”

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Fall 2020 through December 2020

• Gen. Milley’s crisis management team continued tracking domestic activity as civil unrest from the summer of 2020 began dying down and leading up to January 6, including November and December MAGA rallies. 

• December 29, 2020—A meeting between Jamie Fleet’s team and the Biden-Harris team addressed potential scenarios where they flag that Vice President Pence “may go sideways.” Senator Josh Hawley’s statement that he will object to the certification process is referenced. 

• Late December, 2020—As more than 140 Republicans in the House, roughly two-thirds of the GOP members, were preparing to contest the election results on January 6, and with Senator Josh Hawley becoming the first to announce his plan to vote against certifying the Electoral College results and force a debate, “Milley was not alone in his anxiety about the coming days. Other senior leaders in the administration and in Congress were concerned about whether Trump might try to use the powers of the FBI, the CIA, and especially the military to try to stay in office. Starting on December 31, some called Milley seeking comfort. ‘Everybody’s worried about coups, attempted coups, overseas stuff in Iran,’ one congressman told Milley.” 

• December 31, 2020—D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA) Director Christopher Rodriguez and D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser officially requested D.C. National Guard support on January 6. The request was sent to Major General William Walker, the commanding general of the D.C. National Guard, seeking support for the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department with 30 designated traffic posts and six crowd management teams at specified Metro stations.

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January 2, 2021

• Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller conferred with Gen. Milley and Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy on the Mayor’s written request.

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January 3, 2021

• 9:24 a.m.—United States Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund made his first request for D.C. National Guard to House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving: Irving told Sund he doesn't "like the optics of that" and directed Sund to consult with Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger. Afterwards, Irving immediately called Stenger to advise him of Sund’s request, insisting they come up with another plan. Irving told Stenger that he will “never get this by Pelosi.” 

• 11:53 a.m.—Sund brought the D.C. National Guard request to Stenger. Stenger asked Sund if he could unofficially inquire with Walker about what assistance the National Guard could provide if they were needed on January 6. 

• Around Noon—Sund met U.S. Capitol Police head of Protective Services Bureau Sean Gallagher at USCP headquarters. Gallagher advised Sund that he had received a call from Carol Corbin, program director at the Department of Defense, who wanted to know if they would be requesting the National Guard. After having his request denied by Irving and Stenger, Sund asked Gallagher to tell Corbin, “Thank you, but at this time we will not be requesting the National Guard.” 

• Later in the day—Sund contacted both Irving and Stenger and told them about the call from Corbin and the inquiry from the Defense Department. Sund said that based on their instruction to him, he asked Gallagher to inform Corbin that the USCP would not be requesting the National Guard and reiterated that he was still planning to call Walker that evening to advise him of the outcome. 

• 5:30 p.m.—Meeting with President Trump at the White House about Iran: Attendees include Milley, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Acting Secretary of Defense Miller. In his interview with the January 6 Select Committee, Milley said he believed White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, Defense Department Chief of Staff Kash Patel, and White House General Counsel Pat Cipollone also attended the meeting. 

  • During the meeting, President Trump said, "There's going to be a large amount of protesters here on the 6th, make sure that you have sufficient National Guard or Soldiers to make sure it's a safe event." He continued: "I don't care if you use Guard, or Soldiers, active duty Soldiers, do whatever you have to do. Just make sure it's safe." 

• 6:14 p.m.—Sund called Walker to ask what assistance the National Guard could provide if they were needed on January 6. Sund told Walker that he did not have an approved Declaration of Emergency from the Capitol Police Board to make the request and that he was specifically asked to inquire unofficially so that he could “lean forward” on the request.

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January 4, 2021

• Capitol Police confirmed there was no requirement for Defense Department support in a phone call with Secretary McCarthy. 

• Secretary Miller, in consultation with General Milley, Sec. McCarthy, and Defense Department general counsel, reviewed the Defense Department plan to provide support to civil authorities if asked, and approved activation of 340 members of the D.C. National Guard to support Mayor Bowser’s request. Support provided in response to Mayor Bowser’s request includes: 90 personnel (180 total/2 shorts) for traffic control points, 24 personnel (48 total/2 shorts) for Metro Station support, 20 personnel for Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, and 52 personnel for Internal Command and Control. 

• Sec. Miller issued a memo to Sec. McCarthy that authorized the deployment of "the DCNG Quick Reaction Force (QRF) only as a last resort and in response to a request from an appropriate civil authority."

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January 5, 2021

• Sec. McCarthy issued a January 5 memo to Walker placing unprecedented restrictions that stripped Walker's authority to deploy D.C. National Guard Quick Reaction Force without explicit personal approval from McCarthy.

  • Gen. Milley was actively involved in advising Sec. McCarthy on the Jan. 5 memo, “line by line going through this, lining it out, editing, and stuff like that, resulting in this memo.” 

• Mayor Bowser issued a letter to Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, Sec. Miller, and Sec. McCarthy confirming that there were no additional D.C. National Guard support requirements. 

• Before 10:00 a.m.—Sund advised Irving of his conversation with Walker, telling him that Walker had assured him the National Guard would be prepared to repurpose 125 troops and send them once Walker notified the Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy. Capitol Police would need to send someone over to the armory to swear them in. Irving "seemed satisfied" and thanked Sund for following up with Walker.

• 10:00 a.m. briefing—Jamie Fleet, Rep. Zoe Lofgren, House Sergeant at Arms Irving, U.S. Capitol Police Chief Sund, and Aaron Lashure were present. Fleet asked Sund about the status of the National Guard. “Sund said that the Guard could be activated with an emergency declaration from the board, but they are here. They are a phone call away, and if we need them, they are ready to go.” 

• Shortly before Noon—Sund advised Stenger about his Sunday evening conversation with Walker. 

• 6:36 p.m.—Speaker Pelosi’s Chief of Staff Terry McCullough and Jamie Fleet “had a conversation with Mr. Irving [House Sergeant at Arms] later that day on the 5th, where Mr. Irving generally provided a short summary of the conversation, the 10 a.m. conversation, for Ms. McCullough's benefit. And then we spent a few minutes talking about the possibility that there that—that Members during the proceeding, might—there might be disruption among Members.”

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January 6, 2021

• Morning of January 6—House Sergeant at Arms Irving and his staff met with Democratic staff without Republican staff present. 

• 8:19 a.m.—Jamie Fleet called House Continuity Officer Tom Kreitzer. Fleet asked Kreitzer how long it would take to set up an alternate Chamber if needed. The reason behind Fleet's inquiry stemmed from "just a feeling in the neighborhood." 

• 8:30 a.m.—Sec. Miller and Gen. Milley reviewed a Defense Department plan to support law enforcement agencies and requested an exercise regarding Defense Department contingency response options. 

• 11:30 a.m.—Sec. Miller participated in table-top exercise regarding Defense Department contingency response options. 

• 11:57 a.m.—President Trump began his speech at the Ellipse.

• 12:30 p.m.—Pelosi’s Chief of Staff McCullough called House Sergeant at Arms Irving. 

• 12:33 p.m.—House Sergeant at Arms Irving called McCullough. 

• 12:40 p.m.—An alleged pipe bomb is discovered in an alley between the Capitol Hill Club, a GOP hangout, and the Republican National Headquarters blocks from the Capitol.

• 12:53 p.m.—First breach of exterior police lines occurred on the west side of the Capitol.

• 12:58 p.m.—Sund called House Sergeant at Arms Irving, telling him, “We are getting overrun by protesters on the West Front! I need approval to request the National Guard immediately!” Irving replied, “Let me run it up the chain,” and “I’ll call you back.” 

• 1:00 p.m.—Joint session of Congress convened. Vice President Mike Pence released his letter indicating he would not send back certificates from contested states.

• Shortly after 1:00 p.m.—Sund called Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger. Call went to voicemail. 

• 1:05 p.m.—Sec. Miller received open-source reports of demonstrator movements toward the U.S. Capitol. D.C. Metro police arrived at the Capitol.

• 1:06 p.m.—Stenger returned Sund's call. Sund told him that he needed the National Guard immediately. Stenger asked Sund if he asked Irving. Sund responded, “Yes, Paul said he was running it up the chain.” Stenger said, “Okay. Let me know when Paul gets back to you.” 

• 1:07 p.m.—A plainclothes Capitol police officer under the supervision of Sean Gallagher discovered an alleged pipe bomb outside the Democratic National Committee headquarters. Senator Kamala Harris (D-Calif.), the vice president-elect, is inside the building.

• 1:10 p.m.—Trump ended his speech at the Ellipse. Despite last minute plans to go to the Capitol, his Secret Service detail informed the president it wasn’t safe and returned him to the White House.

• 1:21 p.m.—Stenger called Sund again. Sund told him that they were having trouble holding the line and needed the National Guard. Stenger told Sund he’d get back to him and hung up. 

• 1:26 p.m.—U.S. Capitol Police ordered the evacuation of the Capitol complex. 

• 1:28 p.m.—Sund called Irving to ask for an update on the Guard. “Still waiting,” Irving replied. 

• 1:32 p.m.—Jamie Fleet missed a call from Irving. 

• 1:33 p.m.—Irving texted Fleet saying, “Tried to call with an update. Call anytime.”  Fleet returned Irving’s call. 

• 1:34 p.m.

  • Bowser called Sec. McCarthy about USCP assistance. 

  • Sund called Irving again. Irving’s response: “Still waiting.” 

• 1:39 p.m.—Stenger called Sund for an update. Sund advised him that he is still waiting on approval from Irving regarding the National Guard. 

• 1:40 p.m.

  • The Architect of the Capitol reported to Army senior leaders that an estimated crowd of 15,000–20,000 people are “moving in the direction of the National Capitol.” 

  • Irving approached McCullough and other staff members in the Speaker’s lobby behind the House Chamber to ask about permission to seek support from the D.C. National Guard. 

• 1:45 p.m.—Sund called Irving again. Irving told Sund he’s still waiting on approval for the Guard. 

• 1:49 p.m.

  • Sund called Walker and asked for immediate D.C. National Guard assistance. 

  • McCullough spoke with Irving twice. 

• 1:50 p.m.—Irving held a meeting of leadership staff in Stenger’s office to discuss the question of bringing in the D.C. National Guard. House leadership staff, along with some from Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell’s office, were in attendance. They were informed at the time that the Guard had not yet been called. 

• 2:01 p.m.—Sund called Irving again. Irving told Sund to give him just a couple more minutes.

• 2:08 p.m.—Sund called Irving again and was informed that the Capitol Police Board formally approved the request for D.C. National Guard. 

• 2:10 p.m.—Sund called Major General Walker and informed him of the Capitol Police Board’s authorization to request D.C. National Guard assistance. 

• 2:12 p.m.—First breach inside of the Capitol.

• 2:13 p.m.—The Architect of the Capitol reported to Army senior leaders that crowds were continuing to gather at the Capitol, which is “reportedly locked down due to multiple attempts to cross police barriers and police injuries.” 

  • Senator Grassley gaveled the Senate into recess. Grassley’s security team entered the Senate Chamber and evacuated Grassley off the floor, exiting from the north door of the chamber. Other leaders were escorted out the same way. Vice President Mike Pence was escorted from the Senate Chamber by U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Capitol Police. 

• 2:14 p.m.—Fleet called Irving. 

  • It is reported that rioters have breached the second floor of the Capitol. Capitol Division officers were directed to respond to the Senate Chamber, where they began to barricade the doors. 

  • U.S. Capitol Police Command Center issued an alert through the mass notification system, warning of an “inside threat.” 

• 2:17 p.m.—The Task Force Guardian Commander told Quick Reaction Force (QFR) Officer in Charge to get QRF “geared up and on the bus for when Sec. McCarthy approves a change in mission.” 

• 2:19 p.m.

  • Walker emailed Sec. McCarthy and advised him of the Sund request for immediate assistance. Walker received no email or phone response. 

  • D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency Director Christopher Rodriguez initiated a conference call with Walker to help with Sund’s request for D.C. National Guard assistance. 

• 2:20 p.m.—As Pelosi evacuated the building, she asked an unidentified staffer, “Are they calling the National Guard?” The staffer responded, “Yes, ma’am, yes they are.” Pelosi turned to Terry McCullough to ask if she had reached Sen. Mitch McConnell. “And will they call the National Guard?” McCullough answered, “That’s correct.” She continued to complain about the lack of guardsmen as she walked through the underground tunnel to her awaiting SUV. “They’re calling the National Guard now? Should have been there to start off with.”

• 2:22 p.m.—Sec. McCarthy arranged a phone call with the D.C. Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency Director Rodriguez, and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department leadership. McCarthy was “not aware that the building was breached until we were on that phone call. And it was—that's where, you know, if—the call starts, and I get up and I leave. I literally say, find out the requirements, I'm going to get the authority, and I left my office to go down to the Secretary of Defense's office” 

• 2:25 p.m.—Sund learned that the Defense Department was trying to get him on a conference call and then received a text message from Rodriguez. The text provided a telephone number and an access code for the conference call. A second text followed: “This is Chris Rodriguez.” Sund called the number and was placed on hold; he waited several minutes while receiving a second text with the same call information from Walker. Sund hung up and tried calling back several times, getting the same result.

  • House Chamber Officers, a unit within the U.S. Capitol Police Capitol Division, initiated evacuation of the remaining representatives from the House Chamber. 

• 2:26 p.m.—House Speaker Pelosi’s motorcade came within a few hundred feet of the pipe bomb located at the Democratic National Committee when her security detail drove her through a security perimeter and away from the Capitol. Other congressional leaders were on their way to Fort McNair to shelter in place.

• 2:30 p.m. 

  • Sec. Miller, Gen. Milley, and Sec. McCarthy met to discuss U.S. Capitol Police and Mayor Bowser’s requests. 

  • McCullough called Irving. 

• 2:30 p.m. Conference Call

  • Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency Director Rodriguez established a conference call with D.C. and military leaders to seek Secretary of the Army’s authorization for immediate deployment of D.C. National Guard. Army Sec. McCarthy was not on the call. 

  • Participants in the 2:30 p.m. conference call included Mayor Bowser, Sund, Metropolitan Police Department Chief Robert Contee, Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt, Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn, and “all of us” (meaning the Defense Department’s April 2024 witnesses), but “McCarthy never spoke on that call” and “We were told [McCarthy] was unavailable. I called his executive officers to ask to speak to him, and we were told he was unavailable.” (Col. Earl Matthews April 2024 Congressional Testimony)

  • “[Maj. Gen. Walker] tried to call Secretary McCarthy three times between 2:30 and 5pm.” McCarthy's phone went straight to voicemail. Walker did not hear back from McCarthy the entire day. (Brig. Gen. Aaron Dean March 26, 2024 testimony.)

• 2:34 p.m.—Sund texted Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency Director Rodriguez, “I am on the call. Only person.” Rodriguez called Sund back and patches him into the conference call, which is already in progress. Several people are on the line, including Maj. Gen. Walker, Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt, Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn, and other members of the D.C. National Guard and Pentagon military staff. Also on the call are various D.C. government officials, including Mayor Bowser, Chief Contee, and Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency Director Rodriguez. Sund requested D.C. National Guard assistance. Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt didn't like the optics and advised his recommendation would be “not to support the request.” Piatt closed the subject by saying that he would run the request up the chain of command at the Pentagon. 

• 2:40 p.m. (roughly)—En route in an SUV to Fort McNair, Pelosi told McCullough, “I feel responsible. We have responsibility, Terry. Why weren’t the National Guard there to begin with? And I take responsibility for not having them just prepare for war.” Pelosi again raised the deployment of the National Guard. “We’re going to stay here all day, for the rest of our lives, until the National Guard decides to come and get rid of these people?”

• 2:41 p.m.—Stenger called Irving. 

• 2:43 p.m.—Capitol Police Lt. Michael Byrd shot Trump supporter Ashli Babbitt in the neck outside the Speaker’s Lobby; Sund left the conference call due to shots fired in the Capitol so he could pass along the information to congressional leadership. Immediately after Sund left the conference call, General Milley demanded to get the attorney general on the phone so he could “get every cop in D.C. down there to the Capitol this minute, all seven to eight thousand of them.” 

• 2:45 p.m.—The conference call in Army Sec. McCarthy’s office with his staff and D.C. leaders ended on receipt of a report of gunfire inside the Capitol. 

• 2:51 p.m.—Irving called Stenger. 

• 2:55 p.m.—The D.C. National Guard Quick Response Force departed Joint Base Andrews with a police escort to the D.C. Armory, according to the Quick Response Force officer in command. The Task Force Guardian Commander arrived at the U.S. Capitol Police Command Post in the Capitol. 

• 2:57 p.m.—Fleet called Irving. 

• 3:00 p.m.

  • Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) spoke with Army Sec. McCarthy from Fort McNair. “We need a full National Guard component now.”

  • Defense Sec. Miller determined all available forces of the D.C. National Guard are required to reinforce Metropolitan Police Department and U.S. Capitol Police positions to support efforts to reestablish security of the Capitol complex. 

  • Army Sec. McCarthy directed D.C. National Guard to prepare available Guardsmen to move from the armory to the Capitol complex, while seeking formal approval from Sec. Miller for deployment. D.C. National Guard prepared to move 150 personnel to support U.S. Capitol Police, pending Sec. Miller’s approval. 

• 3:04 p.m.—Sec. Miller provided verbal approval to Army Sec. McCarthy for the immediate mobilization, activation, and deployment of the D.C. National Guard to the Capitol, including the deployment of a Quick Response Force. 

• 3:05 p.m.

  • Secure Video Teleconference initiated between D.C. National Guard and Army Sec. McCarthy’s senior leadership. McCarthy is not on the call.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy provided an update to Speaker Pelosi and Senator Schumer regarding his 3:04 p.m. conversation with Defense Sec. Miller. 

• 3:07 p.m.—Irving called Fleet.

• 3:08 p.m.—Fleet texted Irving: “So command center is saying guard on the way?” Irving responded, “Yes, they indicate the National Guard is on the way.” Irving replied, “They are en route. I’m told some leadership from the NG have shown up at the USCP Command Post but not troops yet.” 

• Around 3:10 p.m.—House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer along with Speaker Pelosi and Senator Schumer called Republican Maryland Governor Larry Hogan. Hoyer “was pleading” for Hogan to send the National Guard, but Hogan said he had not received authorization. 

  • According to Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), “Steny Hoyer spoke to the Governor of Maryland, who reported that he had National Guard personnel at the D.C.-Maryland border but he had been prohibited to send them in by the Pentagon.” 

• 3:15 p.m.—The D.C. National Guard Quick Reaction Force arrived at the D.C. National Guard Armory, according to the Quick Reaction Force officer in command. 

• 3:19 p.m.—Army Sec. McCarthy called Schumer and Pelosi again, explaining that Defense Sec. Miller had indeed approved immediate D.C. National Guard mobilization. 

• 3:22 p.m.—Speaker Pelosi called Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, telling him, “Governor, I don’t know if you had been approached about the Virginia National Guard. Mr. Hoyer was speaking to Governor Hogan. But I still think you probably need the ‘okay’ of the Federal Government in order to come into another jurisdiction.” 

• 3:26 p.m.

  • Sund called Maj. Gen. Walker to coordinate a formal written request for D.C. National Guard assistance. 

  • Sund called Maj. Gen. Walker again, requesting immediate assistance. Walker reiterated he had not received deployment approval from Army Sec. McCarthy. 

  • Army Sec. McCarthy called Mayor Bowser and DC Police Chief Contee to tell them there had been no denial of their requests and conveyed Defense Sec. Miller’s approval of the immediate activation of D.C. National Guard. 

• 3:30 p.m.—Bowser told Pelosi and Schumer she was getting “mixed messages” about deployment of the guard. “I thought there was some resistance from the secretary of the Army,” Bowser said.

• Around 3:45 p.m. (“about an hour after the 2:22 call” which ended at 2:45 p.m.)—Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency Director Rodriguez departed Emergency Operations Center for Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters. 

• 3:48 p.m.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy departed the Pentagon for Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters. 

  • McCarthy made a stop at FBI headquarters before heading to Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters to meet with Mayor Bowser and Chief Contee to develop an operational plan. 

• 4:00 p.m. (roughly)—Mitch McConnell told Defense Sec. Miller, “we are in one hell of a hurry, you understand?” related to deployment of the National Guard. Schumer told Miller, who is on speaker on someone’s cell phone, “We need them there now, whatever you got.”

• 4:05 p.m.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy arrived at Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters and met with Mayor Bowser and Chief Contee. McCarthy received a situational brief and developed a plan for the D.C. National Guard to help the U.S. Capitol Police at the Capitol. 

  • HSEMA Director Rodriguez arrived at Metropolitan Police Department Headquarters shortly after Army Sec. McCarthy. “Secretary McCarthy, I believe, was there by the time I got there, at MPD headquarters.”

• 4:07 p.m.—Sund emailed a written request to Maj. Gen. Walker for immediate D.C. National Guard support. 

• 4:08 p.m.—The Architect of the Capitol reported a 40-person Quick Response Force is on the way from Joint Base Andrews to the Armory, “with 184 more on standby” as of 3:23 p.m.

• 4:13 p.m.—According to the Defense Department Executive Secretary, Defense Sec. Miller approved a U.S. Capitol Police request for Pentagon Force Protection Agency support. 

• 4:18 p.m.—Defense Sec. Miller, Gen. Milley, Army Sec. McCarthy, and Chief of the National Guard Bureau discussed availability of National Guard forces from other states in the region. Sec. Miller gave voice approval for out-of-state National Guard forces to muster and be prepared to deploy to D.C. 

• 4:22 p.m.—Sund called Maj. Gen. Walker again, requesting immediate assistance. Walker emphasized he had not received deployment approval from Army Sec. McCarthy. 

• 4:30 p.m.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy called Sec. Miller to brief him on the operational plan. Neither D.C. National Guard nor U.S. Capitol Police were involved in the development of this operational plan. 

  • Sec. Miller concurred with Army Sec. McCarthy’s plan for D.C. National Guard personnel to meet with the Metropolitan Police Department and conduct Capitol perimeter security and clearance operations as part of a joint U.S. Capitol Police, FBI, Metropolitan Police Department, and D.C. National Guard operation. 

• 4:32 p.m.—Sec. Miller provided verbal authorization to re-mission D.C. National Guard to conduct perimeter and clearance operations in support of U.S. Capitol Police. Army Sec. McCarthy was to provide public notification of support. 

• 4:35 p.m.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy said he called Maj. Gen. Walker and informed him that Miller approved the D.C. National Guard re-mission request to support the U.S. Capitol Police. But this call never happened, according to Maj. Gen. Walker and Defense Department witnesses from an April 2024 House Oversight Subcommittee hearing. 

  • Army Sec. McCarthy then admitted he did not call Maj. Gen. Walker because "the Mayor said she wanted to go on TV to communicate to the public, and they had asked me to go with," and "I wanted to get my thoughts collected." McCarthy was "at a table taking notes" and "had to get ready" for the televised press conference.

• 4:40 p.m.—Army Sec. McCarthy had a phone call with Maryland Governor Larry Hogan. Governor promised to send Maryland National Guard troops to D.C., who are expected to arrive on January 7, 2021. 

• 4:47 p.m.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy participated in a national news press conference with Mayor Bowser stating that the D.C. National Guard has been mobilized—despite approval having not yet been communicated to Maj. Gen. Walker.

  • Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency Director Rodriguez also participated in the press conference.

• 5:00 p.m.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy said he reissued the deployment order that he gave Maj. Gen. Walker at 4:35 p.m. but Maj. Gen. Walker maintained this never happened. 

  • According to Col. Earl Matthews, “That’s an absolute falsehood. McCarthy was in a televised press conference.” 

• 5:08 p.m.

  • Maj. Gen. Walker received an order via secure video teleconference to deploy D.C. National Guard from Army Sec. McCarthy’s Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville, in passing. First D.C. National Guard bus departed D.C. Armory. 

  • Maj. Gen. Walker ordered the D.C. National Guard Quick Response Force, now enhanced with additional personnel, to move to the Capitol. 

  • Col. Earl Matthews testified that he was sitting right next to Maj. Gen. Walker in the conference room during the video teleconference when Gen. McConville conveyed the order, and that he was told that the order came not from Army Sec. McCarthy, but from Defense Sec. Miller, that they had the authorization to go. "That's what I was told at the time." The order was relayed via the ongoing video teleconference. “The conference was ongoing, it was running, and General McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army, happened to be on the conference talking to us, and he mentioned that we had the authorization to go.”

• 5:15 p.m.

  • D.C. National Guard personnel departed the Armory en route to U.S. Capitol Police headquarters. 

  • Army Sec. McCarthy briefed Defense Sec. Miller, and they discuss planning considerations including troop levels, and mission duration. 

• 5:20 p.m.—D.C. National Guard arrived at the U.S. Capitol Police headquarters to be sworn in by U.S. Capitol Police. 

• 5:29 p.m.—D.C. National Guard personnel arrived at U.S. Capitol Police headquarters, according to the Task Force Guardian Commander and Quick Reaction Force officer in command. 

• 5:30 p.m.—Maj. Gen. Walker arrived at the Capitol. 

• 5:40 p.m.—The U.S. Capitol Police swore in D.C. National Guard personnel as “Special Police” at U.S. Capitol Police headquarters. 

• 5:45 p.m.—Sec. Miller signed formal authorization for out-of-state National Guard to muster and gave voice approval for deployment in support of U.S. Capitol Police. 

• 5:55 p.m.—D.C. National Guardsmen arrived at U.S. Capitol. 

• 5:58 p.m.—Pence, who was with Sund, told Pelosi, Schumer, and Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) that the House and Senate would be able to reconvene “in about an hour.”

• 6:00 p.m.

  • D.C. National Guard personnel joined the line of law enforcement personnel facing the crowd on the west side of the Capitol.

  • Army Sec. McCarthy briefed Sec. Miller, Gen. Milley, the White House Counsel, the National Security Advisor, and officials from the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Interior, Department of Justice, and FBI by telephone that 150 D.C. National Guard personnel were at the Capitol and another 150 were on the way.

  • Brig. Gen. Matt Smith, Deputy Operations Director, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, Department of the Army, received a report from the Architect of the Capitol that 1,000 police officers were on Capitol grounds and that the building was clear of rioters as of 6:04 p.m. 

• 6:14 p.m.—U.S. Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police Department, and D.C. National Guard successfully established a perimeter on the west side of the U.S. Capitol. 

• 7:36 p.m.—Sec. Miller provided vocal approval to lease fences in support of the U.S. Capitol Police for security of the Capitol building. 

• 8:00 p.m.—U.S. Capitol Police declared the Capitol building secure. The Senate reconvened; a few Republican senators who had supporter an audit of the election withdrew their support and instead pledged to certify Biden/Harris victory.

• 9:02 p.m.—The House reconvened.

January 7, 2021:

• 3:42 a.m.—Pence officially certified Joe Biden the winner of the 2020 presidential election.